California: The Bunkhouse Rule and Intoxication Defense

The Bunkhouse Rule (Aubin v. Kaiser Steel Corp. (1960) 185 Cal. App. 2d 658, 8 Cal. Rptr. 497) might seem like an outdated concept in 2019 workers’ compensation litigation. The recent panel decision, Gonzalez v. Athwal Farms, 2019 Cal. Wrk. Comp. P.D. LEXIS 16, makes clear, however, that this decades-old rule is still relevant to determine whether an injury arose out of and occurred in the course and scope of employment. Gonzalez, an agricultural worker, lived on defendant’s farm in a rented trailer. He was seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident on the farm. The accident occurred on a Sunday, after Gonzalez has been drinking beer with friends, and was driving across the farm to check several agricultural pumps before heading to a store. The panel affirmed the WCJ’s application of the Bunkhouse Rule to find Gonzalez’ injury industrial. It also affirmed his finding that defendant failed to establish the affirmative defense of intoxication.

Application of the Bunkhouse Rule is actually quite broader than its name suggests. Under the first prong (course of employment), the critical inquiry is not whether the employee could choose to live on the employer’s premises, but whether the employment agreement contemplates, or the nature of the employee’s work necessitates, the employee live on the employer’s premises. (Vaught v. State of Calif. (2007) 157 Cal. App. 4th 1538, 73 Cal. Comp. Cases 125) In reaching a determination that the injury occurred in the course of employment, the WCJ found it irrelevant that Gonzalez rented the trailer, since the agricultural nature of his work duties necessitated his live-in presence on the farm. The WCJ also concluded that Gonzalez’ injury arose out of his employment because the motor vehicle accident occurred while Gonzalez was performing duties (checking agricultural pumps) for the benefit of defendant’s farm. This finding satisfies the Rule’s second prong that the injury have a causal connection to employment.

The WCJ’s rejection of the “intoxication defense” should be a cautionary warning to defense counsel. Evidence was presented that Gonzalez had consumed four to eight beers before his injury. Nonetheless, the evidence offered by defendant was insufficient to demonstrate intoxication and that intoxication was the proximate or a substantial cause of the Gonzalez’ injury. Defendant relied on a notation in the medical records that Gonzalez was intoxicated. The notation did not include an explanation as to the basis for that conclusion. Defendant could have deposed the physician who made the notation, but apparently did not. Further, defendant failed to produce evidence, including the custodial chain, of alcohol testing and its results. Moreover, defendant did not present medical-legal evidence as to the effects of alcohol consumption upon Gonzalez. In contrast, there was evidence that Gonzalez was speeding while being chased by three dogs at the time of the accident.

NOTE: A petition for writ of review was filed Feb. 15, 2019 in this case. See C088860. Be sure to check the subsequent history of this case before citing to it.

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