VELAZQUEZ V. GARLAND DECISION BELOW: 88 F.4th 1301 (CA10) CERT. GRANTED 7/2/2024 QUESTION PRESENTED: Federal immigration law allows the government to grant a "voluntary departure" period...
Gutierrez v. Garland "Sergio Manrique Gutierrez petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision dismissing his appeal of an order of removal by an Immigration...
BIA, June 28, 2024 "The Board of Immigration Appeals welcomes interested members of the public to file amicus curiae briefs discussing the below issue(s): ISSUE(S) PRESENTED: What is the scope of...
This document is scheduled to be published in the Federal Register on 07/03/2024 "MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE [and] THE SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY SUBJECT: Extending Eligibility...
DOL, July 2, 2024 "The Employment and Training Administration published an FRN on June 24, 2024 updating the AEWRs under the H-2A temporary agricultural employment program that apply to a limited...
Lara-Garcia v. Garland
"The BIA held that, in order to qualify for relief under Lujan-Armendariz, a state conviction must have resulted in a sentence of no more than one year of probation. ... In sum, the BIA legally erred by holding that, because he received a sentence of three years of probation, Petitioner’s expungement did not qualify under Lujan-Armendariz. ... The BIA’s alternative reason for denying sua sponte reopening was that Petitioner “remains removable” under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) because his 2006 misdemeanor convictions are crimes involving moral turpitude. ... Petitioner is correct that his convictions do not qualify as crimes involving moral turpitude. The government’s assertion to the contrary cites no legal authority, and we are aware of none. ... In short, the BIA legally erred by concluding that Petitioner “remains removable” under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). We deny the petition in part and grant the petition in part. Petitioner’s motion was untimely, so we deny the petition to the extent that Petitioner challenges the BIA’s timeliness holding. But we grant the petition to the extent that Petitioner challenges the BIA’s decision not to reopen proceedings sua sponte. We hold only that, in denying sua sponte reopening, the BIA legally erred. We remand for the BIA “to exercise its broad discretionary authority as to sua sponte reopening against the correct legal backdrop.” Bonilla, 840 F.3d at 579. PETITION DENIED IN PART AND GRANTED IN PART; REMANDED."